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ABSTRACT
Along with house rents, wages have frequently been described as the
ttstickiestu prices in the economy, rarely adjusted more than once a year.
Because of this stickiness (which arises from the transactions costs in-
volvedin changing wages) ,adistinction exists between the adjustment of
wages and the size of that adjustment. This distinction has important
implicationsfor empirical investigations of the determinants of aggregate
money wage changes because the equations fitted in these studies are almost
invariably plagued with aggregation bias unless the non-synchronous pattern
of wage settlements in different sectors of the economy is taken into account.
This is a particularly relevant issue when evaluating the effectiveness
ofincomes policies since some policies have operated by postponing the
implementation of new wage settlements (in which case they aredirected
towards the occurrence of the event) while other policies have taken the
form of specifying a permissible ceiling on wage increases (in which case
they are designed to affect the extent of occurrence of the event, but
not its occurrence). One purpose of this paper is to reevaluate the ef-
fectiveness of incomes policies by making use of information from one
industry both on the frequency of wage settlements and on the size of wage
changes when a settlement takes place. Our empirical work leads us to
conjecture whether the apparent "statistical significance" reported by
researchers with respect to the performance of variables in models of
aggregate wage changes reflects primarily the effects of these variables
on the probability of wages being adjusted rather than the effects on the
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Theoretical models accounting for variations in the rate of wage or
price inflation rarely take explicit account of the costs of altering
money wages or prices1 and yet these models are often evaluated in terms
of their correspondence with data that presumably reflect the existence of
such costs. At least until the more inflationary experiences of the
1970's, the normal situation in British and American manufacturing
industry was for wage rates to be adjusted no more frequently than once a
year even when there were indications of substantial inflationary
pressures. The recognition of this point has induced economists to
incorporate in some fashion the varying time pattern of wage settlements
into their fitted models of wage inflation, but all have taken this
pattern as exogenously determined.2 By contrast, this paper considers the
determinants of the probability of a new wage settlement in addition to
the determinants of the size of the wage change conditional upon a new
settlement taking place. This distinction between the occurrence of an
event and the extent of the occurrence has been investigated in the
*1 am indebted to Tom MaCurdy, Brian McCormick, Christopher Pissarides,
Craig Riddell, Peter Saunders, and an anonymous referee for helpful
comments on an earlier version of this paper.I am also grateful to
Michael Lohrer for his excellent research assistance. Work on this paper
was supported by a grant from the Sloan Foundation to the Department of
Economics at Stanford University.—2—
literature on the demand for durable goods (e.g., Cragg [1971]), on labor
force participation and hours of work (e.g., Heckinan [1974]) and on the
choice of transport modes (e.g., Domencich and McFadden [1979]), but with
few exceptions it has been neglected in empirical work on wage inflation.3
Yet the distinction Is an important one with immediate relevance to
the evaluation of the effects of incomes policies on the course of wage
inflation. The typical procedure in this literature is to regress some
aggregate index of wage changes on dummy variables that indicate the
presence or absence of incomes policies. But this procedure does not make
full use of information about the form of these incomes policies. That
is, incomes policies have sometimes taken the form of specifying a
permissible ceiling on wage increases in which case they are designed to
affect the extent of occurrence of the event, but not the occurrence of
the event. On other occasions, incomes policies have operated by
postponing the implementation of new wage settlements in which case they
are directed towards the occurrence of the event. One purpose of this
paper is to reevaluate the effectiveness of incomes policies by making use
of information both on the frequency of wage settlements and on the size
of wage changes when a settlement takes place.
Where the time pattern of wage settlements differs across sectors
of the economy and where no account is taken of this non-synchronous
pattern, then aggregate quarterly wage change equations will be plagued
with aggregation bias. That is, under these circumstances, the
coefficients of these aggregate wage change equations should not be
expected to display any stability with respect to the addition or deletion-3-
of observations. This is by no means a novel point4 yet its Implications
appear not to have been fully realized because the unproductive search for
plausible and stable aggregate wage change equations continues unabated.
A more appropriate strategy is to investigate the determinants of wage
settlements and wage changes in individual sectors of the economy and this
paper illustrates this strategy for the British coal industry. The task
of extending the analysis to other industries will be addressed on another
occasi on.
II. Conceptual Framework
Collective bargaining agreements in the British industrial
relations system are not legally binding contracts so that, unlike the
unionized sector in the United States, the interval between wage
settlements is not predetermined by the most receftt agreement. On the
contrary, negotiations toward a new wage settlement may be initiated in
any quarter. If there were no costs to negotiating and implementing new
wage agreements, then a new wage settlement would occur whenever the
determinants of wage changes called for a new wage level. In fact, it has
been argued that the transactions costs of negotiating and executing a new
wage contract are by no means negligible nor should such costs be assumed
to be unchanged over time. These costs include the prior determination by
each party of the bargaining posture to be adopted, the resources consumed
in conducting negotiations between the two parties, the expenses borne by
each party in the event of a strike, and the administrative costs of-4-
changing payroll records. Rees' [1970] statement of the nature of these
transactions costs in the labor market is particularly compelling:
"Except in hyper-inflations, employers generally seem
to behave as though the costs of changing wages were
very substantial. When faced with labor shortages,
they frequently lower hiring standards, raise
expenditures on recruitment, and contract-out work
before raising wages.... [E]very change in wages
tends to raise questions of internal equity that can
be very troublesome to solve. Even if it is decided
to raise all wages uniformly, it must be decided
whether this is to be by a uniform percentage or a
uniform amount, and whether the increase is to extend
all the way up the structure of wages and salaries or
only part way. The problems are not unlike those
faced by the United States Congress in separating
problems of the level of income tax from issues of
tax reform. Although we know very little about the
exact nature of the costs of making wagechanges, we
can infer that they exist. Wages are, next to house
rents, the stickiest general class of prices in the
economy, seldom adjusted more frequently than once a
year. This stickiness may be reinforced by unionism
and collective bargaining, but it was present long
before unions arrived" (p. 234).
In fact, during the period from the first quarter of 1948 (1948 I)
to the last quarter of 1975 (1975 IV), the coal miners' nationally
negotiated wage rates were changed in only 24 of the 112 quarters. Wage
rates were not changed each year: five years witnessed no change in wage
rates (in 1948, 1949, 1952, 1959, and 1972) and there was an occasion on
which wages were adjusted in successive quarters and another occasion on
which eleven quarters separated wage changes. Even during the
inflationary 1970's (until 1975 IV), wage rates in coal mining were
renegotiated on only five occasions. A stylized representation of the
situation is given in Figure 1 where the vertical axis measures the
proportionate change in wage rates (Aw) and where X on the—5—
Figure 1
Transactions Costs and Wage Changes
x
horizontal axis in some relevant exogenous variable that exerts a positive
effect on w. The argument here is that, for values of between
and 2' wage rates are completely unresponsive so that the
relationship between X and nonzero values of w is only observed for
values of Xgreaterthan and less than Of course, neither
nor need be unchanged over all observations. The relationship
between w and X for values of X greater than X1 may look like
e1e2 in Figure 1 according to which at the change in wage rates is a
value (w1) that just offsets the unit costs of making adjustments or it
may look like X1e3 according to which infinitessirnal values of w are
feasible.5 The purported downward stickiness of wages implies that X
has to assume much larger absolute values for any downward movement in




observed values of w, the partial derivative of w with respect to X
isless in the south-west quadrant of the graph than in the north—east
quadrant. The distinction between these two hypotheses in the literature
on "downward wage rigidity" is rarely made, let alone tested.
The presence of these transactions costs calls for statistical
methods that discriminate between (i) the effects of a variable on the
probability that wages will change and (ii) conditional on wages changing,
the effects of that same variable on the magnitude of the wage change. It
is not appropriate to measure these second effects by applying con-
ventional least—squares to the nonzero observations on tw since, in this
circumstance, the composition of the sample is being chosen on the basis
of the values of the left—hand variable (that is, observations with zero
values for w are being discarded) so that the conditional expectation
of the error term is not zero. Nor is it appropriate to pool the limit
(i.e., w =0)observations with the nonlimit (i.e., w 0)
observations and estimate a least—squares regression over the entire
sample. The gist of the bias that results in this event is illustrated by
Figure 2 where the crosses indicate the observations describing the "true"
relationship between an exogenous variable X and Aw and where the
dashed line is the (biased) least—squares relationship estimated over all
observations.6
Thus, consider the familiar situation in which in an attempt to
reduce inflation the government appeals to the parties involved in
collective bargaining to display "restraint" in their wage negotiations.







wagerestraint takes the form of a least-squares regression of an index of
wage changes on a dummy variable that takes the value of unitywhen such a
policy is in effect and of zero otherwise.In the presence of trans-
actions costs in adjusting wages, this procedure does not provide an
unbiased estimator of the effect of the incomes policy on the probability
of wages being adjusted in any quarter nor of the effect of the incomes
policy on the size of the wage change conditional on a wage settlement
taking place. Moreover, the size and sign of the bias of the effect of
the incomes policy depend upon the relationship between the dumniy variable
and all the right-hand side variables and, therefore, is likely to vary
from study to study according to the particular regressors appearing in
the regression and to the period of fit. Consequently, it comes as no
surprise that the literature has reached little agreement on quantifying
the impact of incomes policies on wage inflation.7-8-
To address these sample selection problems, an estimation procedure
proposed by Heckman [1979] has been applied: first a probit equation is
estimated over the entire 112 quarters from 1948 I to 1975 IV to determine
the probability of wages changing in the coal mining industry; then from
this estimated probit equation the reciprocal of the Mills' ratio, M (the
ratio of the ordinate of the estimated standard normal to the estimated
tail area of the distribution), is constructed; and, finally, M so
constructed is entered into a least—squares regression of tw on a set of
regressors estimated over the 24 quarters when wage rates actually
increased.8 Provided the equation disturbances are normally distributed,
the ordinary least—squares estimator of the wage change equation that
contains M is consistent, but it is not fully efficient since no account
is taken of the complicated error structure.
III.Empirical Results
This section reports an analysis of the determinants of the
frequency of wage changes and of the magnitude of wage changes in the
British coal industry from 1948 to 1975. The wage series used in the
empirical analysis is that determined by the national agreements between
the National Coal Board and the National Union of Mineworkers and it
covers all manual workers in the coal mining industry. As is well known,
the actual earnings of coal miners differed from these nationally
negotiated rates, particularly so for piece—rate workers. Nevertheless,
for most workers in this industry, the largest changes in the level of-9-
their earninqs were associated with the re-negotiation of their wage rates
by the national agreements. Naturally, as with other collective
bargaining agreements, the re-negotiation of wage rates constituted only
one class of issues settled by these national agreements. For instance,
changes in the structure of pay accompanying the 1955 National Day Wage
Agreement and the 1966 National Power Loading Agreement were inextricably
linked with decisions concerning the overall level of wages. Therefore,
by focusing on the determinants of changes in the level of wage rates, we
necessarily provide an incomplete analysis of the frequency of wage
settlements in this industry.8
A. The Frequency of Wage Settlements
The probit equation estimated to determine the conditional
probability of a wage change taking place in the coal industry is as
follows:








where precise definitions of the variables are given in Table 1 and where
N denotes the standard cumulative normal distribution function. This
equation contains the variables most often used to account for wage
changes at the aggregate level (namely, the percentage change in retail
prices (tpt), the unemployment rate (1) and the incomes policy
variables (the It's)) and it has been augmented with two industry—-10-
Table 1
DescriptiveStatistics on and Definitions of Variables
(The current quarter is denoted by t while quarter t -sIndicates
the period when wage rates were last adjusted. Standard deviations are
given In parentheses beneath mean values.)
All Quarters for Quarters for
quarters which >0 which =0
= l0O.(w-w)/wwhere w is 1.631 7.613 0
(5.094) (8.816)
an Index of coal miners' basic
weekly wage rates (including the
value of allowances in kind)
frequency of tw >0 .214 1 .000 0
(Al2)
- wherePt is 3.867 5.632 3.384
(3.353) (3.805) (3.070)
the retail price index
lOo.(xt -x5)/xtwhere x Is 1.550 2.879 1.187
(5.032) (4.727) (5.077)
the output of deep-mined coal per
manshi ft
=lOG. (Ct - c5)/ctwhere c is 4.777 6.422 4.328
(5.526) (5.808) (5.394)
an index of the selling price of
coal
aggregateunemployment percentage 1.995 1.923 2.014
(.749) (.676) (.770)
D =0from 1948 1 to 1966 III, =1 .339 .333 .341




1 for the first quarter of the .250 .333 .227
year,0 otherwise (.435) (.482) (.421)
S= 1forthe second quarter of the .250 .292 .239
2tyear, 0otherwise (.435) (.464) (.429)
1 forthe third quarter of the .250 .083 .295
year,0 otherwise (.435) (.282) (.459)
1lt1 inthose quarters when the .205 .083 .239
government Implements a wage (.406) (.282) (.429)
"freeze", =0otherwise
1in those quarters when the .205 .292 .182
2tgovernment implements a "twelve (.406) (.464) (.388)
month rule",0 otherwise
—1In those quarters when the .134 .167 .125
3t
government implements a "wage (.342) (.381) (.333)
ceiling",0 otherwise
Note to Table 1: The data on tw, aPt' andUt are taken from issues of the Departmentof Emplonent
Gazette (or formerly the Ministry of Labour Gazette). Information on Is taken frau
issues of the Ministry of Technology Digest of Energy Statistics (or formerly Ministry of
Fuel and Power Statistical Digest) and the data on c are fromtheMonthly Digest of
Statistics. There are 88 quarterly observations for the sub—sample defined by 0
and24 quarterly observations when > 0.—11—
specific variables, the percentage change in coal prices (act) and the
percentage change in coal output per man—shift (x).All percentage
change variables have been measured between the current quarter t and
the quarter when wages were last altered. Given the absence of a reliable
series on the expected rate of price inflation, we have followed the
procedure of expressing the expected rate by a distributed lag function of
the actual rate of price inflation (Ap). Seasonal dummy variables
(the Sit's) have been included to remove any systematic seasonal pattern
in wage settlement dates while the presence of the dichotomous variable
10 and of the interaction between theunemployment rate and
permits the effect of movements in unemployment on wage settlements to
differ before and after the apparent shift in the unemployment-vacancy
relationship in the mid—196O's.'
Inferences concerning the effects of incomes policies on the course
of wage inflation are drawn from dichotomous variables indicating whether
or not an incomes policy Is in effect. The use of dichotomous variables
to measure the effects of incomes policies is customary and it is also
customary to lament the inadequacies of the procedure. This conventional
practice is modified here by the use of three dichotomous variables that
distinguish the effects of different forms of incomes policies: the
variable I identifies quarters when a wage "freeze" was in effect and
ostensibly all wage increases were prohibited; the variable 12
identifies quarters when a "twelve month rule" was instituted under which
the time between wage settlements was mandated to be no less than one
year; and the variable 13 identifies quarters when wage ceilings were in-12—
effect, that Is, quarters when the government declared wage increases to
be no greater than a certain specified level. If the wage freeze achieves
its stated purpose, then I will reduce the probability of wages
changing, while will operate in a similar fashion unless the period
between wage negotiations would have been no less than twelve months in
the absence of this incomes policy. A policy of imposing ceilings on wage
increases is designed to affect the magnitude of the wage change and not
the frequency of wage settlements.
The appendix to Fallick and Elliott [1981] was used to determine
which incomes policies were operative in each quarter. The variable
takes the value of unity from 1948 I to 1951 II, from 1961 III to 1962 I,
from 1966 III to 1967 II, and from 1972 IV to 1973 I; 12 takes the value
of unity from 1967 III to 1970 IV and from 1973 II to 1975 II; and 13
takes the value of unity from 1956 I to 1956 IV, from 1962 II to 1963 I,
from 1965 II to 1966 II, and from 1975 III to 1975 IV. Of course, the
identification of particular types of incomes policy is fraught with
difficulties and it is important to determine whether the results are
sensitive to the classification of the quarters with particular incomes
policies. For this reason, the consequences of a second classification of
incomes policies were examined and the results from this are reported
below.
Estimates of the probit index parameters of equation (1) are given
in column (1) of Table 2 with estimated partial derivatives of the
probability of wage change function evaluated at sample means given in
column (jl).12 Thus the greater the Increase in retail prices (hp)-13—
since the previous wage settlement, th higher the probability of wages
changing in the current quarter.In particular, at sample means, a small
increase in p above its average value raises the probability of a new
wage agreement by 6.6% and this estimate is highly significant by
conventional criteria. Increases in labor productivity raise the
probability of a new wage settlement although this effect would not be
judged as significantly greater than zero by the usual standards. By
these same criteria, no significant association exists between movements
in coal prices and in the frequency of wage settlements. On a con-
ventional likelihood ratio test, the hypothesis that the probability of a
wage increase is independent of movements in unemployment (that is, a
joint test of a4 and cannot be rejected at conventional levels of
significance. Other things equal, seasonal variations in wage settlements
appear to be of negligable importance. Of the three incomes policy dummy
variables only the coefficient on that pertaining to the wage freeze, I,
appears to be significantly less than zero: the results suggest that, at
the mean values of the variables, the imposition of a wage freeze reduces
the probability of a wage settlement in coal mining by almost 24%.
A number of variations on this equation specification yielded
results that differed in no substantive sense from those reported in
column (i) of Table 2. For instance, instrumental variables were found
for the rate of change of coal prices,14 but treating Ac as endogenous
in this way did not materially affect the results. The same was true when
the unemployment rate was measured as an average over four quarters
instead of its one-quarter value used in the estimates in column (i).-14-
Table 2
Estimates of the Determinants of the Probability of Wages Changing
(estimated standard errors In parentheses)
Notes: The logarithm of the likelihood function at its maximum is given by LnL.
















































































































9nL —42 .95 -47 .27-15-
Some researchers (e.g., Henry [1981]) have allowed for the possibility of
an acceleration in the rate of wage inflation in the period following the
relaxation of an incomes policy and this "catch-up" feature was
investigated in these data by constructing dummy variables for those
periods when an incomes policy was dropped and was not replaced by another
form of incomes policy. In fact, the probability of a wage settlement
exhibited no significant association with this "catch-up" variable.
Finally, equation (1) was modified to allow for a different
classification of incomes policies, a classification that turns on whether
the incomes policies have been "voluntary" on the one hand or "statutory"
(or "compulsory") on the other hand. The dichotomous variable '4t takes
the value of unity in those quarters in which a "voluntary" incomes policy
was in operation and of zero otherwise while the variable takes the
value of unity in those quarters in which a "statutory" or "compulsory"
incomes policy was in effect and of zero otherwise. The categorization of
incomes policies into these two forms follows Parkin and Sumner ([1978]
Table 1.1): 14t takes the value of unity from 1948 I to 1951 II, from
1956 I to 1956 IV, from 1961 III to 1963 I, from 1965 II to 1966 II, and
from 1974 II to 1975 III; and takes the value of unity from 1966 III
to 1970 IV, from 1972 IV to 1974 I, and in 1975 IV. The estimates listed
in column (iv) of Table 2 are the maximum likelihood results from fitting
equation (1) after replacing the three incomes policy variables I, 12,
and 13 with the two variables 14 and 15. The corresponding estimated
partial derivatives of the probability of wage change function evaluated
at sample means is given in column (v). The probit estimated coefficient-16-
on 15 is clearly insignificantly different from zero by conventional
criteria while that on 14 is significantly less than zero and it
suggests that, at the mean values of the variables, a voluntary incomes
policy reduces the probability of a wage settlement in coal mining by
almost18%.In other words, these results given no support to the often—
stated belief that a statutory incomes policy is more effective in
reducing the frequencyof wage settlements than a voluntary incomes
policy.
B. The Size of Wage Changes
Considernow the second stage equation accounting for the size of
the wage change in coal mining conditional upon a new settlement being
negotiated. This condition is satisfied in only 24 of the 112 quarters
from 1948 I to 1975 IV so a relatively small number of observations are
available to account for the magnitude of wage increases. The least-
squares fitted equation is






whereMt is the inverse of the Mills' ratio formed from the probit
estimates in column (i) of Table 2, where Ctisa stochastic disturbance
term, and where the other variables are defined in Table 1. The estimates
of equation (2) are contained in column (i) of Table 3 and it is evident
that, with so few degrees of freedom, little can be said with confidence—17—
Table 3
Estimates of the Determinants of the Magnitudeof Wage Increases
(estimatedstandard errors in parentheses)
column (i) column (iij column (iii) column (iv)
constant -.300 .011 .162 .007
(.279) (.080) (.371) (.056)
4.978 .824 -1.130 .818
(3.617) (.530) (4.615) (.326)
-.056 - .593 - .806 -.593 t
(.532) (.267) (.543) (.197)
.168 -.039 .042 .052 t
(.411) (.376) (.281) (.270)
U -.079 —.011 .022 -.020 t
(.070) (.039) (.105) (.032)
D .868 -.433 .474 .547 t
(1.252) (.567) (.348) (.291)
(u.D.) -.241 .159 -.061 -.099 t
(379) (.159) (.128) (.087)
S .090 .051 .036 .054 lt
(048) (.035) (.051) (.025)
S .026 .008 .034 .043 2t
(.050) (.048) (.036) (.029)
S -.014 .030 .098 .051 3t
(.068) (.057) (.119) (.039)
I —.289 -.014 it
(.242) (.047)
I —.234 .131 2t
(.369) (.195)
I .025 .014 3t
(042) (.041)
I .069 -.004 4t
(.176) (.029)





a .022 .026 .019 .019
R2 .874 .857 .895 .893
Notes: The standard error of the regression is given by a.-18-
concerning the determinants of the magnitude of wage increases. Two of
the incomes policy dummyvariableshave negative coefficients, but the
confidence intervals span a wide area in terms of their economic
implications. The consequences of ignoring the censoring of the left-hand
variable are given by the estimates in column (ii) of Table 3 which omit
the Mills' ratio variable, M. The point estimates change noticeably
although, once again, the standard errors accompanying these coefficients
do not permit confident inferences. Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 3
replace the three incomes policy dummy variables I, 12, and 13 with
14 (denoting a "voluntary" incomes policy) and 15 (denoting a
"statutory" or "compulsory" incomes policy). The Mills' ratio variable,
M, in column (iii) is formed from the probit estimates in column (iv) of
Table 2. Once again, it is difficult to derive confident inferences
although on a conventional t-test the coefficient on the statutory incomes
policy variable, 15, does appear to be significantly less than zero. Even
if variables such as the seasonal dummy variables, coal price changes, and
productivity changes are arbitrarily excluded from these least—squares
equations or if coal price changes are treated as an endogenous variable,
the resulting parameter estimates on the remaining variables do not differ
appreciably from those given in Table 3. Surely these results must be
interpreted as being very discouraging with respect to our knowledge of
the determinants of the magnitude of wage changes in the coal industry.-19-
IV.Conclusions
Since the transactions costs of adjusting wages have been largely
neglected in the literature on wage inflation, insufficient attention has
been directed to the distinction between the frequency of wage settlements
on the one hand and the magnitude of wage changes negotiated by these
settlements on the other hand. Government policy-makers have been acutely
aware of this distinction, however, and have directed their incomes
policies at one time towards reducing the occurrence of wage settlements
and at other times towards reducing the size of wage increases. This
paper has presented estimates of the effectiveness of these incomes
policies both on the frequency of wage settlements and on the size of wage
increases in the coal mining industry. An analysis of a single industry
avoids the aggregation bias that plagues much of the research on wage
inflation. Reasonably precise estimates were derived of the effect of
various variables on the frequency of wage settlements, but no such
precise estimates were obtained for the size of wage changes. This leads
naturally to the conjecture that the apparent "statistical significance"
reported by researchers with respect to the performance of variables in
models of aggregate wage changes reflects primarily the effects of these
variables on the probability of wages being adjusted rather than the
effects on the magnitude of wage changes conditional upon wages being
adjusted. As for the implications of the incomes policy variables, a wage
freeze appears to have a large and significant negative effect on the
probability of the occurrence of a new wage settlement. The effects of a
voluntary and a statutory incomes policy are different: the frequency of-20--
wage settlements appears to be affected more by a voluntaryincomes policy
while the magnitude of wage changes seems to be responsive to a statutory
incomes policy.—21—
Footnotes
Among the rare exceptions are Barro [1972] and Sheshinski and Weiss
[1977].
2 Forinstance, Rowley and Wilton [1973] address the temporal aggregation
problem when an equal number of settlements each period are assumed to
take place. Or Ashenfelter and Pencavel [1975] and Smith and Wilton
[1978] augment conventional equations of quarterly wage inflation with
a variable measuring the fraction of workers receiving new wage
settlements.
3 The mainexceptions include work by Coutts, Tarling, and Wilkinson
[1976] and Elliott and Dean [1978].
It is recognized in Dicks—Miréaux and Dow's [1959] seminal paper and in
Black and Kelejian [1972]. Evidence on aggregation bias s contained
in Rowley and Wilton [1974]. Work with individual contract data is
presented in Christofides, Swindinsky, and Wilton [1980], Hamermesh
[1970], and Riddell [1979].
5 This secondspecification is Rosett's [1959] model of friction.
6 Infact, in the British coal mining industry, from 1948 to 1975
nationally negotiated wage rates never fell so all the nonlimit
observations on w were positive values.
For instance, Parkin [1978] finds "no evidence at all either from the
studies of the determinants of inflation or from more direct studies
that wage and price controls materially affect the rate of inflation"
(p. 49) while Henry [1981] claims, "Here the outstanding feature is the
significant effects for incomes policy generally observed, whatever the
basic model of inflation used" (p. 42, emphasis in original).
Blackaby's [1978] survey of incomes policy concludes, "In sum, if we
suppose that over this period there was a variety of forces tending to
produce a rising., trend in the increase in money earnings, then the
experience of the late 1960's and early 1970's is consonant with the
view that the two incomes policies during that period were successful,
so long as they were in force, in holding back this process" (p. 392).
8Thus, if Qisthe predicted value of the index from a fitted probit
on the determinants of a wage change taking place and if N is jhe
standard cumulative normal distribution function, then Mt =N'(Qt)/N(Qt). See Heckman [1979] for further details.
The adjustment of wage rates by decisions reached at the national
agreements was clearly prompted in the 1950's by movements in pay
differentials between time-rate workers and piece-rate workers.-22-
However, a continuous, quarterly, series on the earnings of these two
types of workers is not available. More information on industrial
relations in the coal industry is contained in McCormick [1979].
10 Thedate from which D takes the value of unity (the fourth quarter
of 1966) is associated with the introduction of earnings—related
supplements to unemployment compensation.
The national unemployment rate was used in these equations in
preference to unemployment in the coal industry for several reasons.
First, voluntary separations from the industry were "considerably
affected by fluctuations in the general level of demand for labor"
(McCormick [1979]. p. 106) which is often indexed by the aggregate
unemployment rate. Second, when a contraction in the coal industry's
labor force was required after 1957, this was accomplished primarily
through early retirements and through quits for other jobs and these
individuals frequently escaped registration as unemployed. Third, it
is by no means clear how to interpret movements in an industry's
unemployment rate when labor supply curves to an industry are highly
elastic.
12 The effect ofa variable X on the probability is derived by
multiplying the coefficient of the index, Q, by the normal density
N'(Q) at the evaluation point; that is,
prob./3X =(dN/dQ)(aQ/u)=N'(Q)(Q/aX).At the sample mean values
of the variables, the standard normal density is .228 for the estimates
in column (1). As is evident from a comparison of the entries in
column (ii) with those in column (iii), the ordinary least-squares
estimates and the probit estimates of equation (1) imply very similar
partial derivatives of the probability of wage change function.
13In other estimates, the incomes policy dumr' variable I was
interacted with Ap, x, U, D,and (U.D) to test the hypothesis that
the whole relationship between the probability of wages changing and
these variables alters when a "wage freeze" is in effect. A
conventional likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis.
14 The instrumentalvariables consisted of the percentage change in the
price of gas and electricity, the percentage change in the price of
construction inputs, and the percentage change in an index of consumer
total expenditure. The source for these three variables in the Monthly
Digest of Statistics.—23-
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